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Abstract  In this paper, an EU tax on fishing effort is studied as an alternative
to the system of Total Allowable Catches (TACs). The analysis is conducted un-
der imperfect information, and the hypothesis adopted is that the EU lacks
information about the costs of individual fishermen. In light of this imperfection,
there are at least two reasons for considering an EU tax. First, it can be used to
correct part of the market failure associated with fisheries. Second, it can be
used to secure correct revelation of fishermen types in light of asymmetric infor-
mation.
Key words  Double principal-agent problems, EU fishery, imperfect informa-
tion, taxes.
Introduction
Regulation of the EU fisheries is undertaken on two levels for most important spe-
cies. The level of the total allowable catch (TAC) is decided every year by the Coun-
cil of Ministers. The TAC is then allocated as quotas to the Member States, and the
Member States determine which fishermen are going to harvest the quota (for ex-
ample in Denmark a regulated open-access regime is adopted). The main purpose of
TACs is to protect the stocks.
From an economics standpoint, there are several problems with this scheme.
First, calculation of the TAC is not based on economic principles (Arnason et al.
2000). Instead, biological and political principles dominate when the TACs are fixed
(Karagiannakos 1995). Second, the allocation scheme of the TACs (relative stabil-
ity) was established in 1983 and has not been changed since. It is, therefore, ineffi-
cient because the relative efficiency has changed since then. Third, there are incen-
tives in a quota management system to exceed the quota (Copes 1986). Indeed, for
cod in the North Sea these problems are considerable (Svelle et al. 1997). Fourth,
the Member States do not have incentives to conduct an efficient control and en-
forcement system. Within the EU, the competence to control is placed at the Mem-
ber States’ level, which raises free-riding problems. Finally, many information re-
quirements arise when an optimal quota must be calculated. Thus, it is important to
search for alternatives to the TAC system. In this paper, a management system based
on an EU tax under imperfect information is investigated. The main purpose of the
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paper is to evaluate which variables must be included in the EU tax under various
assumptions about the behavior of the Member States.
Another regulatory regime that secures gains in economic efficiency could be
based on individual transferable quotas (ITQs). Within the EU, two systems can be
imagined. First, a system where the EU determines a TAC and allocates this TAC as
ITQs to Member States is possible. It is then up to the Member States to allocate the
ITQs to fishermen, but it seems reasonable to let both the Member States and the
fisherman trade the ITQs. Second, a system where the ITQs are allocated directly to
the fishermen is also possible. In the fisheries economic literature, there is much
discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of taxes and ITQs. Arguments
against taxes are presented later in the text. With regard to ITQs, the system requires
that markets perform perfectly. Furthermore, in quota management systems there are
incentives to exceed the quota. Finally, the distributional consequences of ITQs have
been criticized, since the resource rent falls in the hands of the current fishermen.
However, an EU ITQ system and an EU tax are both promising areas for future re-
search.
On the basis of the previous comments, the management structure of an EU tax
can be illustrated by figure 1.
In this paper, an economic incentive system where the EU taxes the Member
States is analyzed. Such an incentive system would give the Member States an eco-
nomic incentive to regulate the fishermen. Alternatively, a system where the EU
taxes the fisherman directly would also be possible. However, this system would not
recognize the existing structure, where the EU determines a TAC and allocates this
as quotas to the Member States. Thereafter, the Member States determine which
fishermen harvest the quota. Therefore, a system where the EU taxes the Member
States is examined.
A principal-agent approach is adopted, and principal-agent analysis is defined
by the restrictions that are included. Under full information, participation restric-
tions are included, and under imperfect information, participation and incentive
compatibility restrictions are included. Other definitions could be analysis of imper-
fect information and analysis of situations where the principal wants to induce the
agent to do something that is costly.
Whether an EU tax is likely to be implemented can be questioned. Wilen (2000)
mentions that over 55 fisheries are managed with individual quotas, while none are
managed with taxes. However, within the EU, the idea of taxes and subsidies is not
remote. This point can be seen from the structural policy. The purpose of the struc-
tural policy is to facilitate structural change in the fishing sector by granting finan-
Figure 1.  A Double Principal-Agent ModelManagement of Fisheries in the EU 279
cial aid. Therefore, the EU is already financially engaged in the fishing sector, and
taxes may be seriously considered.
Herein, effort is used as a tax variable. The fisheries economic literature con-
cludes that both effort and harvest can be used as a tax variable under full informa-
tion (Anderson 1986). However, as previously mentioned, there exists a compliance
problem with the TAC within the EU. This problem has the effect that the harvest is
unobservable, so recommending an EU tax based on harvest is of little value. A
problem with taxing effort is that the variable is multidimensional. However, based
on the work of Dupont (1991), it can be argued that days at sea can be used as the
tax variable in the short run.1 The reason for this is that days at sea are a good proxy
for total effort because of the sign and magnitude of the input substitution elastici-
ties. Furthermore, days at sea are easy to monitor using satellites and by counting at
ports.
Three problems associated with taxing fisheries are often mentioned. First, the
information requirements have been criticized. Clark (1990) and Arnason (1990)
point to the fact that cost data is difficult to obtain. Within the double principal-
agent model, one hypothesis could be that the Member States are better informed
about fishermen’s costs than the EU, and have an interest in hiding this information.
With a principal-agent approach, it is possible to solve this imperfect information
problem, since taxes can be designed to secure correct revelation of private informa-
tion. To keep matters as simple as possible, it is assumed that the Member States are
perfectly informed about costs, and that the EU has imperfect information regarding
costs. Furthermore, a simple adverse selection hypothesis is adopted (imperfect in-
formation about an exogenous cost parameter (Laffont and Tirole 1993). That such
an adverse selection problem arises in the EU fisheries can be explained with refer-
ence to Denmark. Anon (1998) gives statistics for the Danish fisheries based on,
among other things, the accounts of six groups of vessels. Within these groups, the
statistics are mean numbers. Assume now that a tax schedule, which is increasing in
effort, is designed on the basis of account statistics, and the mean values of costs
must be the basis of the tax. Assume further that the fishing fleet is heterogeneous
within the groups. Now it is possible that the least-cost fishermen within the groups
have an incentive to pretend to be high-cost fishermen, because the tax payment be-
comes lower by lowering effort. Therefore, all fishermen end as high-cost fisher-
men, and an adverse selection problem occurs. However, the Danish Directory of
Fisheries is better informed about the fishermen’s costs than the EU, but because of
its own best interests, it has an incentive to hide this information from the EU.
Therefore, if the EU wants to tax the Member States, it has to recognize the adverse
selection problem and design taxes to secure correct revelation of types. By securing
correct revelation of types, the EU uses the tax to collect valuable information about
fishermen.
Second, the distributional implications of taxes have also been criticized (Clark
1990), since the fishermen only get infra-marginal rents. This problem can also be
solved by applying a principal-agent approach. In such an analysis, it is customary
to include a participation restriction with a reservation utility (Varian 1992). By cor-
rect choice of the reservation utility, parts of the resource rent can be allocated to
the fishermen.
Third, stock fluctuations raise problems, since the tax must be constantly ad-
justed. However, a solution to this problem could be to transfer the part of the tax
1 In the long run, it will be necessary to construct an index for effort because technology can change.
However, the problem that arises in this case also arises when effort regulation is used. Furthermore,
traditional principal-agent analysis of pollution uses pollution control effort as a tax variable, even
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revenue generated by stock fluctuations back to the fishermen. With this solution,
the fishermen will be compensated for the losses that random fluctuations in stock
size generate. Note also that stock fluctuations generate problems for ITQ systems,
since quotas must be constantly adjusted.
Only one principal-agent analysis of fisheries exists in the literature (Clarke and
Munro 1987). This analysis is conducted under full information, and a combination
of a harvest and effort tax is studied. Clearly, the information requirements of this
structure can be questioned, and an imperfect information approach seems more ap-
propriate. Clarke and Munro (1987) also call for models that include uncertainty.
Furthermore, as noted earlier, the realism of taxing harvest is limited in light of
compliance problems associated with quota management.
Further comments on the literature are relevant for this paper. Within the envi-
ronmental economics literature, there is some discussion of optimal regulation of
pollution in light of imperfect information (Roberts and Spence 1976; Kwerel 1977;
and Jebjerg and Lando 1997). Roberts and Spence (1976) and Kwerel (1977) com-
bine the use of transferable pollution permits and taxes/subsidies to arrive at a first-
best solution. The assumption is, however, that there is no market failure in the mar-
ket for pollution permits, which is a restrictive assumption. Others, therefore, prefer
to use one economic instrument and analyze a second-best solution in light of im-
perfect information. For example, Jebjerg and Lando (1997) conduct a principal-
agent analysis of taxes under moral hazard and adverse selection. The analysis in
this paper is in line with the principal-agent analysis of Jebjerg and Lando (1997),
but applied to a federal tax for a renewable resource.
Within environmental economics there is also some discussion about central
versus decentralized regulation, often in light of imperfect information (Jeppesen
1997; List 1997; Klibanoff and Morduch 1995; Rob 1989; Silva and Caplan 1997;
and Farrell 1987). A main conclusion within this literature is that imperfect informa-
tion at the federal level can be an argument for decentralized regulation. The analy-
sis here differs, since the issue is taxing a natural resource at the federal level.
In the next section, the model used will be introduced and analyzed for the full
information case. The analysis of full information can be seen as a reference case
for the purpose of comparison with imperfect information. Then, a simple adverse
selection model where the Member States do not take any resource considerations is
presented, while the next section presents some possible extensions of the model.
Finally, the paper is concluded.
Introduction to the Model — Full Information
A model with short-run production functions inspired by Smith (1968, 1969) and
Brown (1974) is formulated, where the stock for fishermen i in country j is exog-
enously given. At the EU level, total production is assumed to be equal to the
growth of the stock. The reason for selecting this model is that it is well suited for
analyzing problems of imperfect information, since it does not include discussions
of adjustments toward equilibrium.2
2 In most advanced fisheries economics, adjustment processes toward equilibrium are discussed (Conrad
and Clark 1987). With the assumed non-linearity of the objective function, a gradual adjustment toward
equilibrium is optimal, and a feedback rule can be used to describe the optimal path. Now, the approach
taken in Sandal and Steinshamn (1997) seems promising, since this model makes it easy to describe the
optimal path. The argument for selecting a steady-state model in this article is that principal-agent stud-
ies of fisheries management are a new research topic. However, optimal adjustment processes toward
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The first question encountered is how to model the Member States. A traditional
open-access assumption between Member States could be used. However, in reality,
the EU is engaged in various entry and exit adjustment programs (Holden 1994; and
Frost et al. 1995). It is, therefore, assumed that an industry in Member State j with
nj fishermen exists, where the nj is the number of fishermen in Member State j.
However, what do the Member States maximize? Clearly, the resource rent must be
incorporated, but unlike most traditional fishery economics, tax costs are subtracted
from the resource rent, which appears to be consistent with the theory of regulation
of firms under imperfect information (Laffont and Tirole 1993). In this and the fol-
lowing section, it is assumed that the Member States totally disregard resource con-
servation measures. This assumption can be explained with reference to Hannesson
(1997), who considers the possibility of reaching a cooperative equilibrium in a
fishery game and shows that as the number of firms exploiting a renewable resource
increases, the likelihood of reaching a cooperative equilibrium decreases. This as-
sumption is translated to the Member States’ level in our analysis.
The choice variables are the effort levels for the individual fishermen. The real-
ity of allowing the Member States to maximize over individual effort levels can be
questioned. In practice, the fishermen can be collected in homogeneous groups.
However, in order to keep the theoretical analysis as general as possible, it is useful
to let the maximization occur over the effort levels of individual fishermen.
Therefore, Member State j maximizes:














where x is the fish stock, Eij is the level of effort for the fisherman i of Member
State j, and p is an exogenous price. Gij(x, Eij) is a short-run production function re-
lating the catch for fisherman i in Member State j, Gij, to the stock and effort
(Andersen 1979). It is assumed that ∂ Gij/∂ Eij > 0, ∂ 2Gij/∂ Eij
2 ≤  0, ∂ 2Gij/∂ x2 ≤  0 and
∂ Gij/∂ x > 0. This implies that the marginal product of effort is positive and non-in-
creasing and that the marginal product of stock size is positive. Cij(Eij) is the cost
function for effort for fisherman i in Member State j. It is assumed that  ′ Cij(Eij) > 0
and  ′′ Cij (Eij) > 0. In other words, the marginal costs are positive and increasing.
Tij(Eij) is the EU tax function. Note that the EU taxes fishing effort, and a system
where the EU taxes the Member States on the basis of individual fishermen is
analysed. Note also that a non-linear tax system in Eij is considered. The realism of
this tax structure may be questioned. When applied in practice, the tax structure can
be approximated with a uniform tax schedule within groups of fishing vessels. Fur-
thermore, a two-part linear tax can be a proxy for the non-linear tax. However, the
assumption of a non-linear, individual tax is useful to retain in a theoretical analysis.
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The condition indicates that the value of the marginal product for effort (p∂ Gij/∂ Eij)
is set equal to the marginal costs, which include the marginal tax costs [ ′ Cij(Eij) +
′ Tij (Eij)]. A marginal tax on  ′ Tij (Eij) in the optimal point will generate Eij units of ef-
fort.
How can the EU be modelled? Clearly, maximization of the resource rent mustJensen and Vestergaard 282
be incorporated. Part of the tax revenue from the Member States is also included as
a benefit for the EU. From the normative perspective, this might be explained with
the double dividend hypothesis, which says that the tax revenue collected by the EU
can be used to reduce other distorting taxes. Furthermore, the tax revenue can be
used to finance the financial aid that is given throughout the structural policy. With
the formulation chosen in this paper, it could be argued that double counting occurs
because the tax revenue is a component of the resource rent and included in the ob-
jective function. However, it is useful to include the tax revenue in the objective func-
tion for two reasons. First, the double dividend hypothesis indicates that double counting
shall occur. Apart from correcting a market failure, the tax revenue can also finance
other operations without imposing distorting taxes. Second, including tax revenue makes
the participation and self-selection restrictions binding. Therefore, the double divi-
dend hypothesis is easy to work with in principal-agent models. Note also that the
only principal-agent model within fisheries economics (Clarke and Munro 1987) in-
cludes tax revenue in the objective function. However, the double dividend hypoth-
esis does not state that the whole tax revenue is included in the objective function.
Indeed, the literature assumes a marginal cost of public funds (Brendemoen and
Vennemo 1996). For this reason, only µ Tij(Eij) is included in the objective function
as a benefit, where 0 < µ  < 1 and 1 – µ  is the marginal cost of public funds.
It is assumed that there exists k Member States, and that the maximization takes
place over stock size, individual effort levels, and individual taxes. As in the maxi-
mization problem for the Member States, it may be criticized that individual effort
levels are choice variables. Furthermore, whether the EU could impose a non-linear
tax on the Member States on the basis of individual fishermen is questionable. How-
ever, as mentioned in connection with the Member State maximization problem, it is
useful to impose these assumptions in a theoretical analysis.
With long-run economic yield as the objective, it is assumed that the EU will
maximize:3
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for all j = 1, …, k  and  i = 1, …, nj
F(x) is the natural growth rate of the fish stock and the implication of equation (4) is
that the stock is in steady-state equilibrium, where the natural growth rate is equal to
total catch. Note that the maximization procedure implies that the stock in optimum
is where F′ (x) < 0. Furthermore, it is assumed that F′′ (x) < 0.
3 Maximization of long-run economic yield implies that discounting is excluded. Most advanced fisher-
ies economics includes discounting and gives management of the resource a capital theoretical interpre-
tation (Clark and Munro 1978). Now, optimal control theory can be used as the mathematical method.
Discounting is excluded here due to the fact that studies of fisheries management with a principal-agent
approach is a new research area, but including discounting in principal-agent studies is a promising fu-
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Equation (5) is a participation restriction, which is standard in a principal-agent
analysis (Varian 1992). The participation restriction is formulated such that every
fisherman must earn a non-negative resource rent net of taxes. Alternatively, the re-
striction could have been formulated as a non-negative benefit for the Member
States {Σ [pGij(x, Eij) – Cij(Eij) – Tij(Eij)] ≥  0}. The formulation in equation (5) indi-
cates that the EU does not want to give the Member States any incentive to drive
their fishermen out of the market. Therefore, a non-negative benefit for every fisher-
man is assumed. Equation (5) is stronger than a non-negative benefit to the Member
States, since the sum of the restrictions for all nj fishermen in Member State j is
Σ [pGij(x, Eij) – Cij(Eij) – Tij(Eij)] ≥  0. For reasons of simplicity, the reservation utility
is set to zero. Alternatively, the zero could be interpreted as a result of normaliza-
tion. Note that the participation restriction is part of the EU maximization problem
and that it captures the assumption that the EU is interested in securing the survival
of each individual fisherman in all Member States. It is, therefore, reasonable to ap-
ply the restriction even if existing effort is too high because of open-access, or if the
fishermen can realize a positive profit by doing something else.
Because taxes enter with a positive sign (Varian 1992), the participation restric-
tion will always be binding:
TE p Gx E CE ij ij ij ij ij ij () ( , ) () =− (6)
for i = 1, …, nj  and j = 1, … k
The implication of equation (6) is that the Member States’ resource rent is taxed
away. From the point of view of the EU, this represents a benefit.
By substituting equation (6) into equation (3), the following maximization prob-
lem is obtained (now maximization takes place over the stock size and the indi-
vidual effort levels):


























The Lagrange function may be written as:

















= = = = ∑ ∑∑ ∑ ()( , ) ( ) ( ) ( , ) 1
1 1 1 1
µλ (9)
where λ  > 0 is a Lagrange multiplier and a measure of the value of a marginal in-
crease in the resource stock.
The EU optimality condition for fisherman i in country j is:4
4 Because  ∂∂ 22 GE ij ij  ≤  0, ∂ 2Gij/∂ x2 ≤  0, F′′ (x) < 0 and  ′′ Cij (Eij) > 0, the Lagrange function is concave, and
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The optimal solution for the EU is where the marginal benefits are equal to the mar-
ginal costs. The marginal benefits consist of the marginal resource rent [p∂ Gij/∂ Eij –
′ Cij(Eij)] and the value of the marginal tax revenue {µ [p∂ Gij/∂ Eij –  ′ Cij(Eij)]}. The
marginal cost for the EU is the effect on the resource stock of increased effort evalu-
ated by the shadow price (λ∂ Gij/∂ Eij). Without taxation, the Member States induce
the fishermen to catch up to the point where p∂ Gij/∂ Eij –  ′ Cij(Eij) = 0. The EU wants
the Member States to produce at a point where p∂ Gij/∂ Eij –  ′ Cij(Eij) > 0 and the basic
welfare economic problem is that effort is too large in the unregulated model (the
Member States do not include the effects on the fish stock). Thus, the EU captures
part of the production externality associated with the fish stock. Furthermore, it is
seen that the EU wants an effort level where the marginal costs are larger than the
value of the marginal tax revenue {λδ G/δ Eij > µ [pδ G/δ Eij –  ′ Cij(Eij)]} since pδ Gij/δ Eij
– ′ Cij(Eij) > 0.
The optimal marginal EU tax on Member State j based on fisherman i may be
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From the above, we know that λ∂ G/∂ Eij > {µ [p∂ G/∂ Eij –  ′ Cij(Eij)]}. Therefore, the
marginal tax is positive. An interpretation of this tax may be found by contrasting it
with the tax that would generate a Pareto optimum (where tax revenue is not in-
cluded in the objective function and there is no participation restriction). This would
be  ′ Tij (Eij) = λ∂ Gij/∂ Eij, which completely captures the externality nature of the fish
stock. In this case, call the optimal effort E*. Since the EU includes tax revenue in
the objective function and the value of the marginal tax revenue must be subtracted,
it must be expected that Eij > E*. Because p∂ G/∂ Eij –  ′ Cij(Eij) > 0, the tax does, how-
ever, secure a welfare gain compared to the unregulated optimum. Thus, from a nor-
mative perspective, there are some benefits associated with using it.
A Simple Adverse Selection Model
Assume now that the EU knows that fishermen i in Member State j belongs to one of
two types — low cost (type 1) and high cost (type 2), with Cij2(E) > Cij1(E) for all E,
where the subscripts 1 and 2 denote types.5 The EU has incomplete information
about the type of fishermen i, but sets a probability, π h for h = 1, 2, to type h. A fur-
ther assumption is that  ′ CE ij2()  >  ′ CE ij1() . This assumption is referred to as the
single crossing property and states that the high-cost agent has higher marginal costs
than the low-cost agent.
5 Theoretically, it would be more correct to work with a continuum of types. This is done in some re-
search within the pollution control literature (Jebjerg and Lando 1997). As in the case of discounting,
optimal control theory can be used as the mathematical method when working with a continuum of
types. The assumption about two types is selected because studies of management of a renewable re-
source with a principal-agent approach are a new research area. However, studies that work with a con-
tinuum of types for renewable resources is a promising area for future research.Management of Fisheries in the EU 285
The basic incentive problem is that the low-cost agent may pretend to be a high-
cost agent, because it can be beneficial. It is assumed that the EU wishes to design
the tax system in such a way that there is an economic incentive for the Member
States to reveal the correct type of fishermen. Technically, two self-selection restric-
tions are included in the model.
Now the resource restriction states that the natural growth must equal the sum
of expected catches, and with expected long-run economic yield as the objective, the
EU maximization problem is:
max ( , ) ( ) ( ) πµ 1
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for all low-cost agents in all Member States
pG x E C E T E ij ij ij ij ij ij 2 2 22 22 0 (, ) ( ) ( ) −−≥   (15)
for all high-cost agents in all Member States
pG x E C E T E pG x E C E T E ij ij ij ij ij ij ij ij ij ij ij ij 1 1 11 11 2 2 12 22 ( ,) () () ( ,) () () −−≥ −−   (16)
for all low-cost agents in all Member States
pG x E C E T E pG x E C E T E ij ij ij ij ij ij ij ij ij ij ij ij 2 2 22 22 1 1 21 11 ( , ) () () ( ,) () () −−≥ −− (17)
for all high-cost agents in all Member States
where equations (16) and (17) are the self-selection restrictions. They express that
the Member States must have an incentive to reveal the correct types of fishermen.
With regard to equations (16) and (17), the following is noted. It is assumed that if
the Member States pretend that, for example, a low-cost fisherman is a high-cost
fisherman, it must also deliver a high-cost fisherman effort, induce a high-cost fish-
erman catch, and pay a tax based on the assumption that the fisherman is high cost.
This reflects the assumption that the EU uses all the information it can gather about
the fishermen when taxing the Member States.
In the appendix, it is shown that type 2’s participation restriction and type 1’s
self-selection restriction are binding. This means that:
pG x E C E T E ij ij ij ij ij ij 2 2 22 22 ( , )( )( ) −=   (18)
for all high-cost agents in all Member StatesJensen and Vestergaard 286
p Gx E CE CE CE TE ij ij ij ij ij ij ij ij ij ij 1 1 11 12 22 11 ( , )( )( )( )( ) −+− =   (19)
for all low-cost agents in all Member States
Equation (18) indicates that the tax is designed in such a way that the high-cost
agent’s surplus is exhausted. Since Cij1(Eij2) – Cij2(Eij2) < 0, the low-cost agent re-
ceives a surplus — an information rent (equation [19]). The notion of information
rents to the most efficient types is a well-known result (Varian 1992), and the rent is
the cost difference between the types evaluated at Eij2. The information rent assures
that the Member States will reveal type 1 fishermen correctly.
By substituting equations (18) and (19) into equation (12), a rewritten maximi-
zation problem is obtained and a Lagrange function can be set up. The EU
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for j = 1, …, k  and i = 1, …, nj
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According to equation (20), the EU wishes to set the expected marginal benefit
equal to marginal cost for type 1. The expected marginal benefits consist of the
expected marginal resource rent and the value of the expected marginal tax rev-
enue. The marginal costs consist of the value of the effect on the resource
stock. Note that the value of the marginal tax revenue {µ [p∂ Gij1/∂ Eij1 –
′ Cij1(Eij1)]} is less than the marginal cost (λ∂ Gij1/∂ Eij1), as the marginal resource
rent is positive. For type 2, there is an extra cost. Because type 1 is present and
must be given an incentive to reveal his type correctly, the first order condition
of type 2 must be corrected by π 1[ ′ Cij1(Eij2) –  ′ Cij2(Eij2)] < 0, which is referred to
as the marginal incentive cost. Note also that the probability corrected marginal
costs are larger than the value of the marginal tax revenue [{π 1/π 2[ ′ Cij1(Eij2) –
′ Cij2(Eij2)] + 1/π 2λ∂ Gij2/∂ Eij2 – µ [p∂ Gij2/∂ Eij2 –  ′ Cij2(Eij2)]} > 0], because the mar-
ginal resource rent is positive.
Compared with full information, it is seen that a full information optimum is not
reached, because x and λ  are different between models (Jensen and Vestergaard
1999). This effect is new compared to the standard principal-agent theory (Varian
1992). The reason for this is a restriction on the maximization problem, and in this
case, it is a resource restriction. In Jensen (2001), Eij (full information) and Eij1 are
compared, and it must be expected that Eji1 > Eij, because the resource restriction
must be fulfilled. Comparing the optimal level of effort, Eij2, with the level of effort
under full information, Eij, it must be expected that Eij2 < Eij, because an incentive
cost is present for type 2. This is a standard result within analysis of adverse selec-
tion (Varian 1992).
The marginal EU tax for Member State j, based on fisherman i, can be found by
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From the EU first-order conditions, it follows that the marginal tax revenue is
less than the marginal costs for type 1 {µ [p∂ Gij1/∂ Eij1 –  ′ Cij1(Eij1)] < λ∂ Gij1/∂ Eij1}.
Therefore, the marginal tax for type 1 is positive. In the same way, it appears from
equation (23) that  ′ TE ij ij 22 ()  is positive because the probability corrected marginal
costs are larger than the value of the marginal tax revenue {π 1/π 2[ ′ Cij1(Eij2) –
′ Cij2(Eij2)] + 1/π 2λ∂ Gij2/∂ Eij2  + µ [p∂ Gij2/∂ Eij2 –  ′ Cij2(Eij2)] > 0}. Compared with full
information, the marginal tax for type 1 must be corrected by 1/π 1. For type 2, there
is also a correction of the marginal incentive costs. These corrections are made for
information revelation reasons.
Extensions of the Basic Model
Some of the assumptions made in the simple model might be questioned. The
assumption that the Member States totally disregard the resource restriction
may not seem reasonable. Arnason (1990) builds a fisheries economic model
where individual fishermen take some resource conservation considerations in a
national regulatory framework. Furthermore, the reference made to the model in
Hannesson (1997) may not be reasonable because the number of Member States
in the EU is restricted. A more reasonable assumption is, therefore, that the
Member States take some resource conservation measures.
Moreover, because the Member States are taxed, it must be expected that they
tax the fishermen. Therefore, a double principal-agent problem occurs (figure 1). In
such a model, the Member States wish to induce the fishermen to deliver an optimal
level of effort, but because of the EU tax, the Member States’ optimal level of effort
cannot be reached. The EU uses its tax to assure that the Member States regulate the
fishermen to an optimal level of effort from the EU’s point of view.
Jensen and Vestergaard (1999) analyze such a problem. It is assumed that the
Member States know the type of the fishermen with certainty but that the EU has the
information structure outlined above. The double principal-agent problem is solved
backwards — starting with the fishermen, then the Member States, and finally the
EU. Jensen and Vestergaard (1999) show that the only difference that arises in the
marginal EU tax is that the EU only corrects the part of the production externality
that the Member States do not correct. However, the taxes may be a marginal sub-
sidy instead of a marginal tax, if the level of effort the Member States wants is too
low compared with the level the EU prefers.
Conclusion
In this paper, an EU tax for fisheries has been analyzed. It seems that allowing the
EU to tax the Member States has at least two desirable properties. First, the tax can
be used to correct at least part of the production externality associated with a fish
stock. Second, in light of adverse selection, the tax can be used to secure correctJensen and Vestergaard 288
revelation of the types of fishermen. Note that the second property follows from the
first property, in the sense that the EU is only interested in securing correct revela-
tion of types if it corrects a market failure.
A simple principal-agent analysis has been conducted, and it has been con-
cluded that the EU tax will consist of three components — the marginal value of the
fish stock, an information revelation component, and a value of the marginal tax
revenue component. In a double principal-agent analysis, the EU only corrects the
part of the externality that the Member States do not correct.
There are several advantages of an EU tax system compared to TACs. TACs are
normally based on the maximum sustainable yield concept. The allocation scheme
of TACs to the Member States was determined in 1983 and has not changed since.
Furthermore, the total quotas do not take account of differences in efficiency be-
tween fishermen and do not lead to economic efficiency (Clark 1990). Finally, TACs
and quotas do not incorporate differences in information between the EU, Member
States, and fishermen. In principle, an EU tax solves all these problems.
The analysis in this paper is an example of what Russell (1994) calls complex
regulation, since some of the restrictive assumptions normally used in the discus-
sions of regulatory regimes have been dropped. Here, the traditional assumptions of
perfect information were ignored. Furthermore, tax revenue is included in the objec-
tive function. When some simplifying assumptions are ignored, other simplifying
assumptions must be accepted. In the models presented here, there is no discussion
of adjustment to equilibrium (a steady-state equilibrium is assumed) and no inclu-
sion of a discount rate (long-run economic yield is maximized). Furthermore, it is
assumed that the EU taxes fishing effort, not output (effort is a multidimensional
component). All these assumptions have been subject to a lot of criticism in the fish-
eries economics literature. In the present context, they are justified by the fact that a
principal-agent analysis is conducted. Indeed, the analysis can be seen as a first at-
tempt to discuss fisheries management with a principal-agent analysis. However, in-
cluding discounting and adjustment processes toward equilibrium in analysis of im-
perfect information is a promising future research area.
Despite the fact that the analysis is conducted under imperfect information, the
information requirements of the proposed tax structure may be criticized. For ex-
ample, the tax requires knowledge of individual production functions. Several points
are worth mentioning with respect to this criticism. First, in principal-agent analysis
it is possible to have imperfect information about several variables. Second, proxies
may be used when the necessary data is collected. Third, information requirements
can be seen as a challenge, not an obstacle, when work is done within complex regu-
lation. Fourth, the information requirements are by no means higher than in other at-
tempts to regulate in an optimal fashion. Finally, principal-agent taxes reveal infor-
mation which is valuable for decisionmakers.
It is questionable whether it is reasonable to allow the EU to impose a non-lin-
ear tax on the Member States on the basis of individual fishermen. Note, however,
that a federal tax is sometimes discussed in the economics literature (Segerson,
Miceli, and Wen 1997) and that the individual tax can be approximated with a uni-
form tax schedule within groups. Furthermore, an EU tax may be reasonable within
the fishing industry since it corrects the production externality problem, and a two-
part linear tax schedule may be used as a proxy for the non-linear tax. Finally, con-
trary to a normal resource tax, the tax analyzed here does not induce any exit of
fishermen because of the participation restriction and that the tax can be used to
cover part of the budget deficit in the EU.
Even though the analysis in this paper departs from the relation between the EU,
the Member States, and the fishermen, it can be generalized to several other cases.
The analysis could also be extended to other cases where a federal level is respon-Management of Fisheries in the EU 289
sible for some parts of management, while the Member States of the federal union
are responsible for other aspects of the regulation. Furthermore, the analysis can be
generalized to the case where a national regulatory authority regulates the resource
together with a decentralized regulatory authority.
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Appendix: The Restrictions
For type 1, two restrictions are present and may be written as:
TE p Gx E CE ij ij ij ij ij ij 11 1 1 11 () ( , ) () ≤− (1)
T E pG x E C E pG x E C E T E ij ij ij ij ij ij ij ij ij ij ij ij 11 1 1 11 2 2 12 22 () ( ,) () ( , ) () () ≤− − − − [] . (2)
Since taxes enter in the objective function with a positive sign, one of these restric-
tions must be binding.Management of Fisheries in the EU 291
According to the participation restriction for type 2:
pG x E C E T E ij ij ij ij ij ij 2 2 22 22 0 (, ) ( ) ( ) −−≥ . (3)
The single crossing property implies that:
−> − CE CE ij ij ij ij 11 22 () () . (4)
Equations (3) and (4) imply that:
pG x E C E T pG x E C E T E ij ij ij ij ij ij ij ij ij ij ij 22 1 22 22 2 22 2 0 (, ) ( ) ) (, ) ( ) ( ) −− > −−≥ . (5)
Therefore, the expressions in the bracket of equation (2) are positive, and since it
must be subtracted, it must be the self-selection restriction that is binding for type 1.
Since taxes enter with a positive sign, one of restrictions for type 2 must be
binding. Can it be the self-selection restriction? If this restriction is binding and the
binding self-selection restriction for type 1 is substituted into the binding self-selec-
tion restriction for type 2, the following is obtained:
CE CE CE CE ij ij ij ij ij ij ij ij 11 12 21 22 () () () () −=− . (6)
This violates the single crossing property, and it must, therefore, be the participation
restriction for type 2 that is binding.